Negative Gearing and CGT Changes
Negative Gearing and CGT Changes : What the 2026 Tax Debate Means for Gold Coast Property Owners
Australia’s property tax system is under more serious pressure than it has been at any point in the past three decades. The capital gains tax discount and negative gearing — two concessions that together cost the federal budget more than 13 billion dollars per year and have fundamentally shaped how Australians invest in residential property — are now at the centre of a live political and legislative debate ahead of the May 2026 federal budget.
For Gold Coast property owners, investors, and sellers, the volume of commentary, prediction, and competing claims surrounding this debate makes it genuinely difficult to know what is actually true, what is speculation, and what decisions — if any — should be made right now.
This resource is designed to answer that clearly and factually. It draws directly on primary sources: Senate committee reports, Parliamentary Budget Office analysis, Australian Taxation Office guidance, peer-reviewed economic research, and credible independent modelling. Every major claim is supported by a reference. Every outbound link goes to the original source document.
This article is not financial or tax advice. It is a factual reference document for property owners who want to understand what is happening, why it is happening, and what the evidence actually says about the likely outcomes.
What Is Negative Gearing?
Negative gearing occurs when the deductible expenses on a rental property exceed the rental income it earns. Under current Australian tax law, an investor in this position can claim those net losses against their other assessable income — including salary and wages — reducing their overall taxable income for that financial year.
The Australian Taxation Office explains it directly: a property is negatively geared when deductible expenses exceed the income earned from it, and investors can claim those deductions against rental and other income such as salary and wages. If other income is insufficient to absorb the loss in the current year, it can be carried forward to the next income year.
Negative gearing is not exclusive to property. It can technically apply to any investment where deductible expenses exceed assessable income, including shares. However, residential property is by far the most common and politically significant application of the principle in Australia, and it is the focus of the current policy debate.
According to Treasury data, over one million Australians use negative gearing on investment properties. Approximately one third of those own more than one investment property. Total rental deductions claimed in 2022-23 were approximately 57.1 billion dollars, with around 11 billion dollars in net rental losses primarily benefiting higher-income investors.
What Is the Capital Gains Tax Discount?
The capital gains tax discount allows eligible individual Australian taxpayers — and trusts in most cases — to reduce a net capital gain by 50 percent on assets held for at least 12 months. Complying superannuation funds receive a 33.33 percent discount.
In practical terms: if you sell an investment property after holding it for more than a year and realise a net capital gain of 400,000 dollars, you only pay income tax on 200,000 dollars of that gain. At a 45 percent marginal rate, that discount saves the investor 90,000 dollars in tax on that single transaction.
The ATO’s full explanation of the CGT discount — including eligibility rules, how to calculate it, and how to report it — is available on the ATO website. The ATO’s guide on how to calculate your CGT covers the full calculation process including how losses are applied before the discount.
The discount was introduced in 1999 by the Howard Government, replacing a previous system that indexed the cost base of assets for inflation before calculating the taxable gain. The shift to a flat 50 percent discount was intended to simplify the system and encourage long-term investment. Over the years since, it has become one of the most contested features of Australia’s tax architecture and one of the largest single items of revenue forgone in the entire tax system.
Why Are These Concessions Under Political Pressure in 2026?
The pressure to reform negative gearing and the CGT discount has been building for years. In 2026, three factors have converged to make reform appear more likely than at any previous point.
The budget cost has become impossible to ignore
A 2024 Parliamentary Budget Office analysis estimated that revenue forgone from negative gearing deductions on residential investment property was approximately 7.7 billion dollars in 2025-26, projected to rise to around 14.5 billion dollars by 2034-35. The CGT discount applied to residential properties cost a further 5.87 billion dollars in 2025-26, rising to approximately 8.35 billion by 2034-35. Combined, these two concessions are estimated to cost over 13.5 billion dollars in a single year and more than 22 billion dollars per year within a decade.
The full PBO analysis — including historical figures and medium-term projections — is available at the Parliamentary Budget Office: Cost of Negative Gearing and Capital Gains Tax Discount.
A broader January 2026 PBO analysis prepared specifically for the Senate inquiry estimated total CGT discount revenue forgone for all individuals and trusts at approximately 21.79 billion dollars in 2025-26, including 8.92 billion linked to property, 4.61 billion to shares, and 7.63 billion to trusts. That analysis is available at the Parliamentary Budget Office: Operation of the CGT Discount (January 2026).
The distributional skew has become a political liability
The benefits of these concessions are highly concentrated among higher-income earners. According to Parliamentary Budget Office and Treasury analysis, the top 10 percent of income earners account for approximately 82 percent of total CGT discount savings, and the top one percent account for around 59 percent of savings. In 2025-26, the top income decile alone accounted for 4.44 billion dollars of the 5.87 billion dollars in CGT discount savings on residential property.
The 2025-26 Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement from Treasury, which provides the full distributional analysis, is available at treasury.gov.au — 2025-26 Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement.
For a government focused on intergenerational equity and positioning itself as addressing the housing affordability crisis affecting younger Australians, this distributional profile has made reform a politically attractive narrative. Between 2001 and the latest census, home ownership rates among Australians aged 25 to 34 have declined significantly, while investor activity — supported by tax concessions — has continued to grow.
The housing market distortions have been independently quantified
Research from the e61 Institute — a non-partisan, non-profit economic research organisation — analysed 900,000 property investments held between 2008 and 2025. It found that 46,000 of those investments had before-tax returns below mortgage rates but became profitable after-tax solely because of the 50 percent CGT discount. The same research found that the discount reduces the effective tax rate on property investment returns from around 31 percent for debt-free investors to approximately 19 percent for heavily leveraged investors — creating a structural incentive to borrow more than underlying investment fundamentals would otherwise support.
The full e61 research paper is available at e61 Institute: Housing Leverage and the Capital Gains Tax Discount. Their Senate Select Committee submission is at e61 Institute: Submission to the Senate Select Committee on the CGT Discount.
What Is the Senate Inquiry and What Did It Actually Find?
On 4 November 2025, the Senate established the Select Committee on the Operation of the Capital Gains Tax Discount. The committee held public hearings, received submissions from economists, housing researchers, government agencies, industry bodies, and advocacy groups, and tabled its final report on 17 March 2026.
The full report — all 143 pages — is available at aph.gov.au: Report on the Operation of the Capital Gains Tax Discount.
The majority report, supported by Labor senators, made four key findings. First, the CGT discount provides concessional treatment relative to labour income that distorts investment decision-making and incentivises tax planning. Second, the discount distorts the allocation of investment across the economy more broadly. Third, in combination with negative gearing, the CGT discount has likely skewed housing ownership away from owner-occupiers and toward investors. Fourth, the design of these concessions contributes meaningfully to income, wealth, and intergenerational inequality in Australia.
What Senator Pocock recommended
The most detailed and specific reform proposal in the report came from independent Senator David Pocock. His recommended package has two main elements. On the CGT discount: remove it entirely for residential property purchased after 1 July 2026, while grandfathering all existing holdings; and provide a reduced 25 percent discount for new homes built after 1 July 2026, provided they are held for longer than three years. On negative gearing: remove arrangements for an investor’s second and subsequent investment properties from 1 July 2026, and disallow rental deductions for vacant properties from the same date.
Senator Pocock’s full additional comments are at aph.gov.au: Additional Comments from Senator David Pocock.
What the Greens recommended
The Greens recommended substantially winding back the CGT discount across asset classes and abolishing it entirely on investment property sales. They argued against grandfathering, contending that grandfathering defeats the purpose of releasing housing stock to owner-occupiers. They also supported limiting negative gearing to one investment property for existing investors, phased out over time.
What Labor’s senators said
Labor senators’ additional comments carefully avoided committing to any specific reform design. They emphasised the importance of housing supply and indicated that any tax changes should be considered alongside other budget advice. Their comments are available at aph.gov.au: Labor Senators’ additional comments.
What the Coalition’s dissent said
Coalition senators filed a formal dissenting report arguing that majority findings were overly simplistic, that housing supply constraints rather than tax policy are the primary driver of affordability problems, and that reducing the CGT discount risks deterring new construction and reducing market turnover through a lock-in effect. The full dissent is at aph.gov.au: Coalition Senators’ dissenting report.
What Has the Government Actually Committed To?
As of mid-April 2026, the answer is less than the public debate implies.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has publicly referenced intergenerational equity and housing affordability as government priorities. Treasurer Jim Chalmers has spoken about structural issues in the housing and tax systems. Neither has confirmed a specific reform design publicly.
According to ABC News reporting from March 2026, by technical definition Labor had not announced a CGT policy when the Senate report landed, even while senior ministers were making public statements about reform options. That ABC analysis is at abc.net.au: Labor hasn’t got a capital gains tax policy yet, but it’s already making the case.
Treasury has been confirmed as modelling a reduction in the CGT discount from 50 percent to 33 percent as the leading option ahead of the budget, reportedly limited to established residential properties rather than all asset classes. The May 12, 2026 budget is the decision point. Until that announcement, the final reform design remains unconfirmed.
What Does Independent Economic Research Say About the Likely Impacts?
Will property prices fall?
The Grattan Institute’s research consistently finds that the national price impact of CGT discount reform would be modest. Their modelling estimates that reducing the CGT discount and phasing it in over five years would decrease property prices by approximately one percent nationally, concentrated among investor-held established dwellings in high-investor segments. Grattan’s full analysis is at grattan.edu.au: Reforming the Capital Gains Tax Discount and their landmark earlier report at grattan.edu.au: Hot Property — Negative Gearing and Capital Gains Tax Reform.
Treasury officials confirmed at a Senate estimates hearing that proposed CGT reforms would have minimal impact on overall housing prices or supply, while acknowledging the changes could shift the ownership balance toward first home buyers at the margin.
A general equilibrium modelling study by Crawford School researchers estimated that full removal of both the CGT discount and negative gearing would lower housing prices by approximately 0.4 percent nationally while increasing home ownership by around 2.6 percent — a modest national effect consistent with other credible analyses.
Will rents rise?
The evidence does not support predictions of a large national rent surge, though localised effects in tight markets are a genuine risk.
Grattan’s modelling found that immediately halving the CGT discount would raise median rents by less than one dollar per week across Australian capital cities, even accounting for a reduction in new home construction. Research from the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute found that when an investor sells, the property typically goes either to another investor — producing no net change in rental supply — or to a first home buyer, which simultaneously removes one property from rental supply but also removes one household from the renter pool. A genuine contraction in net rental supply only occurs if the market loses investor stock without a corresponding reduction in renter demand.
The ABC’s analysis of how CGT design affects rental and housing outcomes is at abc.net.au: Effect of capital gains tax changes on housing affordability likely depends on design.
What does history actually show about rents and negative gearing?
The most frequently cited historical precedent is the Hawke Government’s quarantining of negative gearing between 1985 and 1987. The claim that this caused a national rental crisis is deeply embedded in political rhetoric. The factual record is more nuanced.
ABC Fact Check’s detailed historical analysis found that during that period, rents increased notably only in Sydney and Perth — two cities that already had rental vacancy rates below two percent before the change. High interest rates and very low pre-existing supply were significant contributors to those specific rent rises. The 1987 Hawke Cabinet papers attributed the increases to local market influences rather than the tax measure itself. A national rental crisis did not occur.
The full ABC Fact Check analysis is at abc.net.au: Fact check — Did abolishing negative gearing push up rents?
What about new housing construction?
This is the area where reform design details matter most. If reforms penalise established dwellings more than new construction — which is the explicit intent of the Pocock design, through a preferential 25 percent discount for new homes built after the start date — the policy can in theory redirect investor demand toward new supply rather than simply removing investors from the market.
The Housing Industry Association has commissioned modelling suggesting combined reductions to the CGT discount and negative gearing would cut new housing supply materially. The Grattan Institute disputes the scale of those projections. Both sets of findings are highly sensitive to specific design assumptions about how new versus established stock is treated and whether reforms are grandfathered or phased in.
What Would a July 2026 Start Date Mean in Practice?
For investors who already own property
If the final legislation follows a grandfathering model, properties purchased before 1 July 2026 would retain their existing CGT discount treatment. The 50 percent discount would remain available on those assets when eventually sold, provided they are held for at least 12 months at the time of sale. Negative gearing arrangements on first investment properties would also be unaffected under the proposed design. Existing investors with one established property face no immediate change to their tax position under a grandfathered reform.
For investors purchasing after the start date
If the CGT discount is removed for residential property purchased after 1 July 2026, the after-tax return profile of new investment changes materially. The full net capital gain becomes taxable at the investor’s marginal rate rather than only 50 percent of it. For an investor on the 45 percent marginal rate selling a property with a 500,000 dollar net capital gain, the difference between the current discount and no discount is 112,500 dollars in additional tax on that single transaction. This changes investment economics most significantly for strategies that rely primarily on capital appreciation rather than rental yield.
For multi-property investors
The Pocock proposal’s restriction of negative gearing to a first investment property directly targets portfolio-building using tax-assisted borrowing. For investors with two or more properties, losing negative gearing on all properties beyond the first could materially affect cash flow — particularly for those with high leverage and thin yields.
The contract date versus settlement date — a critical technical distinction
Under existing ATO rules, a CGT event occurs on the date a contract is signed — not the settlement date. The ATO states this plainly: if you sell a house, the CGT event happens on the date of the contract, not when you settle. Full ATO guidance on CGT events is at ato.gov.au: CGT events — when a CGT event occurs.
If the final legislation uses the acquisition contract date to determine whether a property is subject to new or old CGT rules, a buyer who exchanges contracts before 1 July 2026 but settles after that date would be treated as having acquired the asset under the old rules. This distinction is critical for anyone trying to act before a legislative deadline. Professional legal and tax advice is essential before acting on any assumed understanding of how a deadline applies to a specific transaction.
Will There Be a Sell-Off? What Happens to Property Listings?
One of the most common questions from Gold Coast sellers and investors is whether the reform debate will produce a wave of investor listings — either before the deadline or after as investors exit a less tax-advantaged market.
The honest answer is that the direction of the effect is genuinely uncertain because two mechanisms push in opposite directions.
A short-lived increase in listings before 1 July 2026 is plausible if investors expect materially worse after-tax treatment on new acquisitions and choose to reposition portfolios ahead of the start date. This kind of deadline-driven bring-forward behaviour is well documented around major tax changes.
However, major economic analyses also emphasise a countervailing lock-in effect. Because CGT is only payable on realisation, higher effective CGT rates on post-reform acquisitions can paradoxically reduce turnover among holders of grandfathered pre-reform assets. Selling a grandfathered property means reinvesting into an asset without the same discount — making holding the original asset indefinitely more attractive. The Coalition Senate dissent cited evidence that grandfathered reform designs can reduce overall transaction volumes over time.
If negative gearing restrictions materially increase holding costs for multi-property investors, that creates genuine financial pressure toward portfolio trimming for the most exposed segment. But investors have multiple responses available beyond selling: raising rents, restructuring ownership, refinancing to reduce cash outflow, or gradually reducing portfolio size over time.
The most plausible Gold Coast scenario is a mixed picture: some portfolio trimming among the most leveraged multi-property investors, a possible short-term increase in listings before the budget announcement, and no sustained sell-off of the scale that would materially shift the supply-demand balance in a market with the Gold Coast’s underlying population growth drivers.
What the Reserve Bank Has Said
The Reserve Bank’s submission to the 2003 Productivity Commission inquiry on first home ownership is the most substantive on-record statement from the RBA on this topic. The RBA stated it did not see a case for an outright prohibition on negative gearing for residential property investment, because offsetting losses from one activity against income from another is part of the normal operation of Australia’s personal income tax system. The RBA also stressed that any modifications should aim for neutrality across different types of investment and should carefully consider the effects on existing versus new investors and on the rental market.
The full RBA submission is at rba.gov.au: Policy Considerations — Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry on First Home Ownership.
What Does This Mean for the Gold Coast Property Market?
The Gold Coast sits in a specific and interesting position within this national debate — not because it is uniquely exposed, but because its market characteristics create a more complex picture than national averages suggest.
The market has a substantial investor component, particularly in the high-density unit sector across coastal corridors, in lifestyle and hinterland segments, and in newly developed residential estates in the northern and southern growth areas. Any policy that reduces investor appetite for established dwellings will be felt more acutely in those areas than in markets where owner-occupier demand is overwhelmingly dominant.
At the same time, the Gold Coast has structural demand characteristics that provide meaningful support independent of investor tax settings. Interstate migration — particularly from New South Wales and Victoria — has been a sustained driver of population growth and housing demand. Lifestyle appeal continues to attract both permanent residents and lifestyle-driven purchasers. Owner-occupier demand across family home segments is strong and largely unaffected by changes to investment tax settings.
Rental vacancy on the Gold Coast has been extremely low in recent years, consistent with the broader southeast Queensland pattern of tight supply and strong population growth. This is precisely the market condition most associated with localised rent pressure following any reform that reduces investor participation — consistent with what occurred in Sydney and Perth during the 1985-87 period, where local vacancy rather than national tax policy was the determining factor.
What this means for sellers in 2026
For owner-occupiers planning to sell on the Gold Coast in 2026, the tax policy debate is relevant context — but the most practically important consideration is how the selling campaign is structured, not what the budget announces.
A campaign that reaches the full breadth of available buyers — owner-occupiers, upsizers, downsizers, lifestyle purchasers, interstate buyers, and investors — is more resilient to any shift in any single buyer category than a campaign implicitly structured around investor demand. If investor sentiment weakens following a budget announcement, a well-run campaign that has already created genuine competition across buyer types is far better insulated than one relying on investor buyers to drive the result.
Questions Every Gold Coast Property Owner Should Be Asking Right Now
Whether you are an investor, a homeowner considering selling, or someone trying to understand what this market environment means for a future decision, the following questions are the practical framework for navigating 2026.
If reform is announced in the May budget broadly consistent with current proposals, does your specific property fall into a category most exposed to reduced investor demand? High-density units in coastal investor corridors are more exposed than detached family homes in owner-occupier suburbs. Know which category your asset sits in.
If you are holding an investment property on the Gold Coast, does your return profile depend primarily on tax-assisted capital gain — or does the property generate sustainable yield independent of the CGT discount and negative gearing? If the answer is the former, your investment thesis changes materially under even a moderate reform scenario.
If you are planning to sell in 2026, is your selling campaign structured to attract the full breadth of buyer types? A campaign that creates genuine competition across owner-occupier and investor buyers is more resilient in any policy environment.
If you are considering purchasing an investment property after July 2026, what do your investment returns look like without the 50 percent CGT discount? If the numbers only work with the discount in place, that is a structural risk in your investment model regardless of what any legislation ultimately says.
If you own multiple investment properties and negative gearing is restricted to the first, what is the cash flow impact on your overall portfolio? The time to model that scenario with your accountant or financial adviser is before a budget announcement, not after.
The Bottom Line
Australia’s negative gearing and CGT discount arrangements are under the most sustained and evidence-backed political pressure since the Howard Government introduced the current system in 1999. The debate is not manufactured. The budget cost is real, documented, and projected to grow. The distributional skew is independently verified. The housing market distortions have been quantified with 18 years of actual investment data by researchers without a political agenda.
But the loudest claims on both sides of this debate are not supported by the weight of evidence. Credible independent modelling consistently points to modest national price effects — less than one percent in most scenarios — and small median rent impacts, even under relatively aggressive reform designs. The outcomes are highly sensitive to the specific design of any reform, particularly how new versus established stock is treated, how grandfathering is structured, and whether changes are phased in or applied immediately.
For Gold Coast property owners, the most useful position in this environment is to understand the evidence clearly, monitor what the May 2026 budget actually announces, seek qualified professional advice before making any decision driven by a legislative deadline, and ensure that any selling campaign is structured to generate genuine competition across the full pool of available buyers.
The Gold Coast market’s underlying fundamentals — sustained population growth, interstate migration, lifestyle demand, and genuine owner-occupier depth — have not changed. What may change is the competitive landscape for certain property types in certain segments. Understanding where your property sits within that landscape is the starting point for every good decision in 2026.
This article is a factual reference resource and does not constitute financial, legal, or taxation advice. Readers should seek qualified professional advice before making any property, investment, or tax-related decisions.
Resource Panel: Primary Sources and References
All factual claims in this article are drawn from primary sources. The following references are organised by institution. All links go directly to the original source document.
Australian Taxation Office
- ATO — Rental expenses: what qualifies, how to claim, and what cannot be claimed as a deduction
- ATO — CGT discount: eligibility, discount rates, and how to apply the discount
- ATO — CGT events: when a CGT event occurs and the contract date versus settlement date rule
- ATO — How to calculate your CGT: the full calculation process including applying losses before the discount
- ATO — Residential rental properties: complete guidance hub for property investors
Parliamentary Budget Office
- PBO — Cost of Negative Gearing and Capital Gains Tax Discount: annual revenue forgone with projections to 2034-35 (2024)
- PBO — Operation of the CGT Discount: analysis prepared for the Senate Select Committee (January 2026)
Senate Select Committee on the Operation of the Capital Gains Tax Discount
- APH — Final report: Report on the Operation of the Capital Gains Tax Discount (March 2026, full 143-page report)
- APH — Additional comments from Senator David Pocock: the detailed July 2026 reform package recommendation
- APH — Chair’s additional comments
- APH — Labor Senators’ additional comments: Labor’s formal position on CGT reform
- APH — Coalition Senators’ dissenting report: the full case against CGT discount reform
Treasury
- Treasury — 2025-26 Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement: revenue forgone and full distributional analysis
- Treasury — Negative gearing: policy background, tax treatment, and operation within the income tax system
Grattan Institute
- Grattan Institute — Reforming the Capital Gains Tax Discount: Senate inquiry submission, modelling, and findings on rent and price impacts
- Grattan Institute — Hot Property: Negative Gearing and Capital Gains Tax Reform (full report with detailed modelling)
e61 Institute
- e61 Institute — Housing Leverage and the Capital Gains Tax Discount: analysis of 900,000 property investments held 2008-2025
- e61 Institute — Submission to the Senate Select Committee on the Operation of the CGT Discount
Reserve Bank of Australia
ABC News and ABC Fact Check
- ABC News — Labor hasn’t got a capital gains tax policy yet, but it’s already making the case (March 2026)
- ABC Fact Check — Did abolishing negative gearing push up rents? Detailed historical analysis of the 1985-87 period
- ABC News — Effect of capital gains tax changes on housing affordability likely depends on design (February 2026)
Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI)
- AHURI — Modelling landlord behaviour and its impact on rental affordability: insights across two decades
- AHURI — Modelling negative gearing and capital gains tax reforms: transitional arrangements and politically acceptable reform pathways
Disclaimer: This article is provided for general information and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial advice, legal advice, tax advice, or credit advice. We do not hold an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) or an Australian Credit Licence (ACL). While this article is based on research from sources cited throughout, it is a general commentary only and has been prepared without taking into account your personal objectives, financial situation, or needs. It should not be relied on as a basis for making financial, investment, tax, or borrowing decisions. You should seek your own independent advice from a suitably qualified and licensed professional before acting on any information in this article.







